![]() (eds.) ACNS 11: 9th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, vol. Springer, Germany, Berlin (2010)ĭe Cristofaro, E., Manulis, M., Poettering, B.: Private discovery of common social contacts. 6477 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology–ASIACRYPT, vol. Springer, Berlin (2004)ĭe Cristofaro, E., Kim, J., Tsudik, G.: Linear-complexity private set intersection protocols secure in malicious model. Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., Vanstone, S.: Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 5536 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. (eds.) ACNS 09: 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, vol. In: Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D., Fouque, P.-A., Vergnaud, D. IEEE Computer Society (2009)ĭachman-Soled, D., Malkin, T., Raykova, M., Yung, M.: Efficient robust private set intersection. Ĭhiou, S.-Y., Chang, S.-Y., Sun, H.-M.: Common friends discovery with privacy and authenticity. Springer, Berlin (2003)Ĭhapman, P., Evans, D., Huang, Y., Koo, S.: Common Contacts–Privacy-preserving shared contact computation. Springer, Germany, Berlin (2011)īoyd, C., Mathuria, A.: Protocols for Authentication and Key Establishment. 6571 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. Nicolosi (eds.) PKC 2011: 14th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography, vol. That is, users may perform context-dependent contact discovery using any subset (circle) of their contacts.Īteniese, G., De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G.: (If) size matters: Size-hiding private set intersection. ![]() Our CDS constructions allow users to select their (certified) contacts to be included in individual protocol executions. We show that they can be efficiently deployed on smartphones, thus allowing ad hoc and ubiquitous contact discovery outside of existing social networks. The practicality of our proposals is confirmed both analytically and experimentally on different computing platforms. Our constructions do not rely on a trusted third party (TTP)-all contacts are managed independently by the users. We build provably private and realistically efficient CDS protocols for private discovery of mutual contacts. We also propose the concept of contact certification and show that it is essential to thwart impersonation attacks on social relationships. ![]() To this end, we define a novel privacy feature, called contact-hiding, that captures our strong privacy goals. We realize private contact discovery using a new cryptographic primitive, called contact discovery scheme (CDS), whose functionality and privacy is formalized in this work. This paper motivates and introduces the concept of Private Discovery of Common Social Contacts, which allows two users to assess their social proximity through interaction and learn the set of contacts (e.g., friends) that are common to both users, while hiding contacts that they do not share. Consequently, the transition toward social clouds cannot set aside mechanisms to control the disclosure of social links. However, for many individuals, personal relationships belong to the private sphere, and, as such, should be concealed from potentially prying eyes of strangers. A key step in establishing new links entails the reconciliation of shared contacts and friends. ![]() The latter have already taken an essential role in people’s daily life, helping users to build and reflect their social relationships to other participants. Digital services that are offered, and consumed, on the basis of social relationships form the backbone of social clouds-an emerging new concept that finds its roots in online social networks.
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